sense, in the East. But it is a grievous mistake on that ground to pass over Oriental Philosophy as of no account. Because the construction of philosophical systems is so much more marked in the mental energy and mobility of Greek thought, we must not be deluded into the notion that Oriental Philosophy has not much to teach the Occidental mind. Oriental dreaming and inactive Quietism did not keep the speculative ideas of the Oriental peoples from having much that was fruitful for the History of Philosophy. These must be garnered into the treasuries of philosophic wisdom. Already in the philosophy of India we meet many notions that recur in later historical developments. We are Occidentals, and have seen but in part. Besides, we must do justice to Oriental Philosophy at the outset of any history of intellectual development, in order that the Graeco-Oriental Philosophy of the Alexandria of the Ptolemies may take its proper place in, and relation to, the historical development. No difficulty in translating Oriental mysticism, and dreaming into terms of Occidental thought must keep these things from being done. Philosophy, taking thus its rise in the East, will remark the comparative absence of genuine speculative philosophy among the Chinese. I say "comparative", for it is a clear, however common, mistake to suppose there is no speculative philosophy of the Chinese. That philosophy followed an a priori method-the mode of Descartes rather than of Baconand the lines of Oriental theory have here gone out in the study of nature in ways that are striking enough. It is not too much to say that there has been a speculative theism of China, which, spite of the blendiugs of materialism and agnosticism, has held to Deity as personality, not a mere principle. Then it will allow Hindu philosophy, so expressive, in its wide and varied range, of the highly speculative character of the Hindu mind, to declare the infinite and eternal excellence of God. For in the unity and perfection of the Godhead does the Oriental find deepest delight. The early intrusion of the speculative element is, in fact, the surprising thing. Only after many strange glorifications was it destined to reach the generalisation of a Cenrtal One self-existent. Lord of the multiform creation. Finely does this speculative element shine out in the deep and subtile idealistic philosophy of the Upanishacls.
The idea of God as the Unknown and Unknowable-an idea which has played so large a part in modern thought and writingwas no product of the Alexandrian time. It is much less a creation of Herbert Spencer. It lies far back in Oriental Philosophy. But that philosophy had a deeper idea in relation to God. Pie was for it the Absolute and Unconditioned. Such conceptions the A3exandrian School long afterwards sought to reduce to harmonious and intelligible relation to other truths by its theory of emanations -an hypothesis perpetually present to Oriental speculation. Enough now to say that ancient ernanative theory was strong just where modern evolution is weak, and weak just where modern evolution is strong-that is to say, emanative theory was strong in its hold on the forceful Supreme Power, and weak in its grasp of the processes of development. God was for Oriental thought the All, outside Whom there could be nothing by way of limiting Him. And so it took too easily a pantheistic tinge. Take the Vedanta and the Sankhya philosophies, chief of the ancient Indian philosophical systems. The teaching of the Vedas was an optimistic polytheism, that of the Upanishads a pessimistic pantheism. In the Vedantic philosophy we find a speculative form of conceiving Deity which is that of a pantheistic system at once mystical and idealistic. The Brahma is the Infinite, and, as such, alone has being. Individual souls have no real existence, but are so much illusion. Being, out of Him, there is none. The soul is one in being with Him, being, in fact, a part of Him. The transmigration of the soul is here very complete, for it includes cosmic as well as individual cycles. But the Brahmins philosophically introduced the law of causality into the spiritual world, and made each transmigration the result of the previous life. So transmigration came to wear the rigour, the universality, and the invariability of Fate. In its speculative development, Vedantic philosophy bears the true impress of Oriental thought in its strange contempt for activity, its indolent quietism, and its sublime disregard of moral law. And it is as monistic a system as Sankhya philosophy was dualistic, with Nature and Soul as the terms of the antithesis. The Sankhya pliilosophy denies a Soul supreme over all, such as the World-Soul oi the Upanishads. The .Upanishads have for their fundamental npte the identity of the individual soul with the world-soul. To Sankhya doctrine matter stands on one side, while it sees an infinite number of individual souls, without attributes, and known only in a negative way, on the other side. Buddhism denied the individual soul, as the Sankhya philosophy did not. But, in the groundwork of both Sankhya and Buddhist metaphysic, the primary substance of things manifests itself by the direct development of the world and contingent existences, without any direction or interposition of a Divine and personal Agent. Orientalism knew no sin but as seeming, for it knew no law but as forms of nature. Absorption at last in the Infinite and Eternal was its only end for man. The Veclic position was that the souls of the good go to Heaven, and there is nothing about transmigration. As for Buddha, he refused to decide whether Nirvana meant complete extinction or unending and unconscious bliss. The keystone of the Buddhist system, however, was the fatal law of transmigration as governing all things in Heaven and on earth. And Buddhist philosophy has, in whole, its own points of peculiar interest, such as its instinct for the avoidance of evil, its rejection of a super-phenomenal ego, its belief in moral causation, and its hope to rob evil of all power here or hereafter by the moulding of life and character.
The points of contrast between such Orientalism and Hebraism are very evident, but we are not here concerned to go into these. We are only dealing with the place and suggestiveness of the study of Oriental philosophy. And in such study the Oriental mind of today must be no more neglected than the Oriental mind of the past. To that mind, Nature is God's image, the abode within whose beauty and sweetness the Immanent Spirit dwells. But, withal, in their disparagement of objective existence and the world of appearances, Hindu philosophers have not done wisely or well. They have given way to world-flight and pessimistic world-conception. The importance of maintaining right basic religio-philosophical conceptions has been impressively taught the world by these philosophers. The fatal one-sidedness of Brahmanic monism has found its nemesis in the dualism, asceticism, pessimism, and political dependence of the Hindu nations. We must hold by the objectivity of nature not less truly than we do by that subjectivity which is a universal note of our existence. Even when the Infinite has baffled the heights of Hindu speculation, we still find that Vedic sages have seen in all the forces and phenomena of nature the inworking light of Deity. Near of kin to this intoxication of nature is the Oriental's conception of the Eternal Spirit as supremely revealed in man's own spirit. So great, indeed, becomes the pressure of the infinite that the Hindu view of man grows indistinct and unsatisfying. It is for us to remember that, even when we turn to Christianity, as it appears to the Oriental mind, there conceptions may be possible to that mind from which our Occidental thought, with its craving for severe theory and rigid definition, may have something to learn. If, on the other hand, shortcomings in its philosophic presentations stand out to our view, these very deficiencies of Oriental conception will by contrast carry much suggestive teaching. Turning now to the philosophy of the ancient Persians, which was no strict system, we yet find within its dualism-the most marked the world has seen-elements of an interesting philosophical character in themselves, and of importance for their influence on religious thought in subsequent times. It enshrined as Deity Ahura Mazda, causer of all causes, a Deity at the same time more spiritual and free of pagan anthropomorphism than the early Jewish Yahveh as sometimes represented. In Him was centred all conceivable good. Mere abstractions, if you like, but very real and significant to that early time were the conceptions attained of the love, law, and power of Deity. Iranian thought held that this Good God could not prevent the evolution of evil in the beings He created. Existence to it implied polarity; there could be no good without corresponding evil. It left its distinctive ethical principle in a relation too external, with a strange neglect of interior moral perfection. But Iranian thought, too, has its surprises. For it discovers a capacity for refined definition, which we are only too apt to think peculiar to the Occidental mind. It loes so in certain ways for which it has been possible to claim a rational priority in respect of Greek speculative thought. And the noral interest of Zoroastrian thought surpasses the speculative. Too ntently veiled in mystery was the philosophic teaching of the Egyptians to call for much attention in this connection. With them and other such ancient peoples as the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Phoenicians, speculative elements are but few, and need not detain us. And yet, surely no one can make a careful study of Egyptian religion, for example, without feeling that great speculative ideas, like the Divine Unity, and the Demiurgical Mind or Logos idea, developed by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, were present at least to the esoteric Egyptian mind. Enough, however, has been said to shew how unwarranted is the customary philosophical neglect of Oriental philosophy, despite the suggestive character of its essential ideas. The Greek mind, which is so often taken to have given rise to philosophy, was, no doubt, an independent growth, with products all its own. But why forget that that mind received stimulating influences from Eastern thought? And why overlook that its philosophic products undoubtedly incorporated within themselves Oriental notions and ideas, so that these forgotten sources really are matres cogitationum nostrarum? Why, I would further ask, do we so readily strive to enter into the fulness and inventiveness of Greek thought, and remain so easily content with a merely curious, somewhat idle, interest in Oriental thought? The answer is, of course, found in the historic circumstances, moral evolution, and political development which connect us so much more in our European past with the philosophy of Greece. And Windelband tells us in a footnote that Oriental philosophizings remain "so remote from the course of European philosophy, which is a complete unity in itself," that, in his view, there is no occasion to "enter upon them". This is at least in keeping with what the Latin poet says of Europe as audax Japeti genus. But there is surely in all this no sufficient reason for our remaining content with an incapacity to make ourselves at home with different thought-conditions and influences than those which have dominated European progress. Philosophy has surely a yet more universal note to strike than this merely European one. It surely cannot forget that, woven of one warp and woof throughout as is the Universe of thought, not without Asiatic Philosophy can it be made perfect.
